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Categorical knowledge and episodic memory have traditionally been viewed as separate
lines of inquiry. Here, we present a perspective on the interrelatedness of categorical
knowledge and reconstruction from memory. We address three underlying questions:
what knowledge do people bring to the task of remembering? How do people integrate
that knowledge with episodic memory? Is this the optimal way for the memory system to
work? In the review of ﬁve studies spanning four category domains (discrete, continuous,
temporal, and linguistic), we evaluate the relative contribution and the structure of
inﬂuence of categorical knowledge on long-term episodic memory. These studies suggest
a robustness of peoples’ knowledge of the statistical regularities of the environment,
and provide converging evidence of the quality and inﬂuence of category knowledge
on reconstructive memory. Lastly, we argue that combining categorical knowledge and
episodic memory is an efﬁcient strategy of the memory system.
Keywords: episodic memory, categorical knowledge and expectations, memory tasks, categorical domains, prior
knowledge, rationality
INTRODUCTION
Reconstruction from memory relies not only on incomplete rep-
resentations stored in memory, but also on categorical knowledge
learned from past experiences. As such, many aspects of our expe-
riences do not have to be episodically remembered, but can be
extrapolated from our categorical knowledge. For example, when
recalling the last time you visited a coffee shop, you might uti-
lize not only the episodic information related to that speciﬁc
visit, but also general knowledge and experiences accumulated
over many coffee shop visits. You might recall that you ordered
a tall coffee, not because you have detailed episodic memories,
but because you have knowledge that coffee sizes are called tall,
grande, and venti, and you typically order tall coffees. In this
example, it is apparent that categorical knowledge can be used to
facilitate recall, however, you can also imagine how this knowl-
edge can lead to errors if, for example, the last time you visited
the coffee shop you were really tired, and ordered a venti instead.
Although using knowledge for that speciﬁc visit would result in
error, using categorical knowledge to aid memory is on average
an advantageous strategy. Filling in noisy memory with category
knowledge can improve recall performance, and without it, recall-
ing the coffee shop visit might be beyond the available episodic
representation.
In this review, we proffer a perspective on the relations among
categorical knowledge1 and episodic memory. Although the asser-
tions of more traditional approaches in memory research, such as
false memory, are that prior knowledge results in errors, the sum
1We use the terminology categorical knowledge interchangeably with the concept of
semantic memory/knowledge, but choose this term speciﬁcally because it is a subset
of semantic knowledge, and the domain of knowledge that we are addressing in this
review.
total of the ﬁndings presented in this review suggest that this is not
the complete story. We address three underlying questions: What
knowledge do people bring to the task of remembering? How do
people integrate that knowledge with episodic memory when the
information to be remembered is noisy and incomplete? Is this the
optimal way for thememory system to work?We ﬁrst address each
question broadly, and then present a review of previous investi-
gations on the interactions of episodic memory and categorical
knowledge across four categorical domains encompassing dis-
crete, continuous, temporal and linguistic categories. Eachdomain
highlights interesting features of categorical expectations.
WHAT DO PEOPLE BRING TO THE TASK OF REMEMBERING?
People bring a wealth of knowledge and expectations to a variety
of cognitive tasks. Beginning with Sir Francis Bartlett’s (1932)
seminal research, it is evident that people use knowledge of
cultural and social norms, as well as cognitive expectations of
the environment, to facilitate performance across tasks. Further-
more, the knowledge that people possess is well-calibrated to the
statistical regularities of the natural world (e.g., Huttenlocher
et al., 1991; Huttenlocher et al., 2000; Grifﬁths and Tenenbaum,
2006; Brady and Oliva, 2008). For example, people’s predic-
tions about the statistics of everyday events—such as expected
life spans, movie runtimes, and cake baking times – are on aver-
age quite accurate relative to the true statistics of these events
(Grifﬁths and Tenenbaum, 2006).
An interesting property of expectations is that they can trans-
late into domains with which people have limited experience, to
further assist cognitive performance. This is consistent with the
idea that statistical learning can operate at a categorical level and
can be generalized to novel categories, novel exemplars, and/or
categories for which people have little statistical knowledge (e.g.,
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Brady and Oliva, 2008; Jern and Kemp, 2013). This provides a
compelling argument for people’s sensitivity to the regularities
of the environment, which extends across several domains of
perception and cognition, including visual perception (Eckstein
et al., 2004; Epstein, 2008; Todorovic, 2010), object recognition
(Biederman, 1972; Palmer, 1975; Biederman et al., 1982; Holling-
worth andHenderson,1998; Torralba, 2003), object categorization
(Galleguillos and Belongie, 2010), color perception (Mitterer and
de Ruiter, 2008), preparing motor actions (Nissen and Bullemer,
1987), and parsing language (Trueswell, 1996).
Here, we review studies from four category domains (i.e., dis-
crete, continuous, temporal, and linguistic) that quantify peoples’
categorical knowledge and expectations. Each task measures the
signal thought to be based on the categorical representations
in the mind of the observers and is consistent with categorical
knowledge. The most notable ﬁnding across domains was that
people expressed a surprising level of agreement, with both the
expectations of others and the true stimulus distribution. In addi-
tion, each domain provided further insight into the structure of
categorical expectations. In the discrete domain, salience and pro-
totypicality were important factors for knowledge of categorical
relationships. Discrete category knowledgewasmeasured via a task
where participants provided lists of all the objects associated with
particular natural scene types, e.g., kitchens and ofﬁces (Hem-
mer and Steyvers, 2009c; Steyvers and Hemmer, 2012). Responses
reﬂected the intuitive notion that central and salient objects in
a scene have high response frequencies and that certain scene
types are associated with very iconic objects, e.g., refrigerators in
kitchens or computers in ofﬁces. There was also strong agreement
between this categorization condition and a separate perception
phase, where participants named the actual objects present in
the natural scenes. For example, for an urban scene, the top
three responses were the same whether participants were asked
to name objects associated with urban scenes (categorization) or
saw an image of an urban scene (perception): car, building, and
people.
Furthermore, familiarity with a scene type appears to inﬂuence
performance. The effect of familiarity was particularly evident
in the continuous domain. Continuous category knowledge was
measured via a task where participants estimated the average
expected sizes, as well as minimum and maximum expected sizes,
of real world objects (Hemmer and Steyvers, 2009a,b). Partici-
pants expressed stronger agreement for basic-level objects (e.g.,
apples) with which they were more familiar, and appeared to use
knowledge about the common sizes of those objects to make size
judgments. However, for less familiar objects, such as a chayote
(a type of gourd), size estimates were closer to the superordinate
category mean (e.g., fruits) such that participants appeared to use
general knowledge at this category level to guide size judgments.
Categorical knowledge also extends to temporal events. Peo-
ple have strong expectations for the ordering of actions that form
prototypical event sequences. Expectations for temporal events
were measured by showing participants a sequence of events in
achronological order and having them reconstruct the true order
based on expectations, without seeing the true order of events
(Hemmer et al., 2010). When asked to order well-deﬁned tem-
poral events, such as a wedding, they successfully reconstructed
the chronological event sequence, despite the fact that the events
were presented in no coherent order. This was contrasted with
performance for events with undeﬁned temporal order, such as
random clay animations, where the ability to reconstruct the
true events was no better than chance. This suggests that people
are sensitive to the regularities of the ordering of actions within
events.
Lastly, within the linguistic domain, knowledge for bi-
directional categorical membership of color wasmeasured via two
tasks (Persaud and Hemmer, 2014): linguistic categorization (e.g.,
given a color swatch, name this color) and category representa-
tiveness (e.g., given a color name, generate what the color looks
like). In the linguistic task, participants demonstrated hierarchical
naming granularity for color categories, such that they expressed
the strongest agreement for seven of the universal color categories
– red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, and pink (Berlin and
Kay, 1969; Uchikawa and Shinoda, 1996; Hardin, 2005; Xu et al.,
2010; Webster and Kay, 2012) and a naming preference for 14
additional subordinate level labels within those categories (e.g.,
aqua-blue, light-blue, dark-blue). Importantly, the novel hue gen-
erating task showed a similarly strong agreement for hue values
associated with the seven universal color categories, demonstrat-
ing a bi-directional relationship between the universal tendencies
in color naming (Regier et al., 2005) and universality in color gen-
eration. This indicates that people have very detailed bi-directional
knowledge of color that is highly reﬂective of the natural envi-
ronment and that this category knowledge expresses a shared
communicative value.
The ﬁndings from these studies clearly demonstrate that peo-
ple are sensitive to the regularities of the environment and that
this sensitivity inﬂuences performance in a variety of perceptual
and cognitive tasks. Importantly, we argue that this inﬂuence also
extends into the domain of episodic memory. In the next section,
we explore how the inﬂuence of category knowledge contributes
to episodic memory.
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF CATEGORICAL KNOWLEDGE IN
EPISODIC MEMORY?
Long-term episodic memory coding is known to rely on gist and
meaning, including schemas (Bartlett, 1932; Rumelhart, 1980;
Brewer and Treyens, 1981; Mandler, 1984), scripts (Schank and
Abelson, 1977; Bower et al., 1979), and frames (Minsky, 1975).
Over time, memory becomes more abstract and information is
retained at this higher abstract level of knowledge (i.e., super-
ordinate level). However, the cognitively preferred basic level of
abstraction for categorization has also been shown to be a pre-
ferred level of retention in episodic memory (Pansky and Koriat,
2004). Thus, the relative contribution of category knowledge and
how it operates on long-term episodic memory remains unclear.
A further dichotomy of the inﬂuence of category knowledge on
episodic memory persists for reconstruction from memory. One
standard ﬁnding in the literature is that categorical knowledge is a
source of errors (e.g., Carmichael et al., 1932; Deese, 1959; Brewer
and Treyens, 1981; Roediger andMcDermott, 1995). For example,
intrusions increased as a function of context, in the form of high
prior expectations for objects consistent with natural scenes, e.g.,
books in ofﬁces, when those objects were not present (Brewer and
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Treyens, 1981). Similarly, studies of false memory, using the well-
known Deese, Roediger, andMcDermott paradigm (Roediger and
McDermott, 1995), found intrusions of semantically associated
but unstudied target words. However, such studies manipulate the
naturalness of stimuli (e.g., the removal of books from ofﬁces),
which in turn, impacts the usefulness of categorical knowledge.
When experimental stimuli reﬂect the statistical regularities of the
real world for which people’s knowledge is well-attuned, categor-
ical knowledge can make a substantive contribution to episodic
memory (see Steyvers and Hemmer, 2012 for a discussion on
ecological validity).
Here we illustrate the relative contribution and the structure of
inﬂuence of categorical knowledge on long-term episodic mem-
ory for naturalistic stimuli. An interesting ﬁnding was the relative
contribution of categorical knowledge to reconstruction from
memory (Hemmer and Steyvers, 2009c; Steyvers and Hemmer,
2012). While episodic information would be expected to make
the greatest contribution to memory, guessing with categorical
knowledge alone revealed a strong baseline contribution. In the
discrete domain, participants recalled objects from natural scenes
following a 2 or 10 s study interval. Accuracy in this task was quite
high, with average accuracy above 85%, even after the sixth out-
put position. Further, recall that the categorization task, outlined
in the previous section, required participants to produce a list of
objects associated with a given scene type. When these responses
were evaluated against an actual image of that scene type (this can
be thought of as a zero second study condition), average accuracy
was above 70% for the ﬁrst six responses. This difference between
actual recall in the memory task and guessing with prior knowl-
edge in the categorization task reveals the contribution of episodic
memory. While it is not surprising that prior knowledge can be
used to ﬁll in the holes in noisy memory, it is unexpected that the
baseline contribution of categorical knowledge alone would be so
substantial.
The most striking ﬁnding of the effect of categorical knowl-
edge is the average improvement in performance for stimuli
associated with pre-experimental knowledge, relative to control
stimuli not associated with pre-experimental knowledge (Hem-
mer and Steyvers, 2009a; Hemmer et al., 2010; Hemmer et al.,
in revision). Within the continuous domain, recall was better
for familiar objects (i.e., fruits and vegetables), even when par-
ticipants did not remember studying the objects, compared to
unfamiliar objects (i.e., random shapes). Similarly in the tem-
poral domain, 50% of participants achieved perfect or near
perfect performance in the reconstruction from memory of the
true order of events for which they had category knowledge,
whereas only 5% achieved equivalent performance in the recon-
struction from memory of events for which they had no prior
expectations.
Furthermore, the contribution of categorical information to
episodic memory reﬂects the granularity of category knowledge.
A hierarchical inﬂuence is observed when knowledge is available
at two or more category levels (Hemmer and Steyvers, 2009a;
Persaud and Hemmer, 2014; Hemmer et al., in revision). In the
continuous domain, recall for the sizes of objects was biased
both by the mean size of the speciﬁc object studied (e.g., a
pear) and by the mean size of all objects in the category (e.g.,
fruits). Smaller objects in the category (e.g., raspberries) were
recalled to be larger and larger objects (e.g., pineapples) were
recalled to be smaller. At the same time, an object studied at
the small end of that object range (e.g., a small pear) was over-
estimated, whereas an object studied at the large end of that
range (e.g., a large pear) was underestimated, independent of
the absolute study size. This regression to the mean effect per-
sists for recall of height as a function of gender (Hemmer et al.,
in revision), and recall of hue values associated with color cat-
egories (Persaud and Hemmer, 2014). Taken together, these
ﬁndings show that categorical knowledge exerts a strong inﬂu-
ence on reconstructive memory. In the subsequent section, we
will discuss the optimality of such a strategy by the memory
system.
IS THIS AN OPTIMAL WAY FOR THE MEMORY SYSTEM TO
WORK?
The reviewed studies suggest that the perceptual andmemory sys-
tems systematically extract and exploit statistical regularities of
the environment. Starting with his pioneering approach, Ander-
son (Anderson, 1989, 1990; Anderson andMilson, 1989; Anderson
and Schooler, 1991) has argued that memory is optimized tomake
the best possible inference about the world given perceptual input.
Episodic memory can be viewed as a problem of extracting and
storing information from noisy signals presented to our senses,
which need to be combined with knowledge about the structure
of the environment. In the summarized studies, the use of stim-
uli for which people have categorical knowledge capitalizes on the
idea that humans work in concert with their environment. People
use knowledge to make sense of their environment, and appear
to use this information optimally in a broad range of cognitive
tasks.
A number of rational models have been developed in episodic
and semantic memory (Anderson, 1990; Shiffrin and Steyvers,
1997; Steyvers et al., 2006; Steyvers and Grifﬁths, 2008; Xu and
Grifﬁths, 2010) to characterize the computational problems peo-
ple face when trying to make sense of the world given the sparse
and noisy input from the senses. In categorical perception, Hut-
tenlocher and colleagues presented a model of category effects in
which immediate reconstruction from memory was based on a
weighted average of episodic memory traces and prior knowledge
in the form of category information (Huttenlocher et al., 1991,
2000).
The ﬁndings reviewed here have been well described by
a rational model, assuming that reconstruction from mem-
ory uses multiple sources of information – episodic and cate-
gorical (Hemmer and Steyvers, 2009b; Persaud and Hemmer,
2014; Hemmer et al., in revision). Speciﬁcally, in these tasks,
the goal of the observer is to reconstruct the original study
events (sizes of fruits and vegetables, heights of people or
hues of colors) as best as possible given noisy episodic mem-
ory content and prior knowledge of the stimulus attribute (i.e.,
size, height, or hue). This Bayesian approach gives a prin-
cipled account of how knowledge of the world is combined
with memory content to recall information about events. This
model predicts systematic biases toward the category center,
or prior category mean, at reconstruction, and a trade-off
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between the strength of knowledge and the strength of memory.
When category knowledge is strong and memory representa-
tions are noisy, recall will more closely reﬂect category knowl-
edge. Conversely, when knowledge is vague, but memory is
strong, recall will more closely reﬂect the evidence stored in
memory.
Similarly, when knowledge is available at two or more cate-
gory levels, this trade-off corresponds to the intuition that for
unfamiliar study features it is unlikely that category knowledge
at the speciﬁc object level is reliable and inference instead reverts
to a higher level categorical knowledge. Using prior knowledge at
multiple levels of abstraction is an efﬁcient strategy that allows
generalization over experiences and correction of noisy memo-
ries. Assuming that noisy memory content is optimally combined
with category knowledge of the environment, the memory system
can exploit environmental regularities to “clean up” this noise and
improve average recall performance.
DISCUSSION
In this review, we have presented a perspective on the interrelated-
ness of categorical knowledge and memory. People have category
knowledge and expectations that are closely aligned with the true
environment. This knowledge plays a valuable role in memory
retrieval and can increase the accuracy of memory. Further-
more, this interaction between episodic memory and structured
knowledge representations is not an isolated phenomenon. These
ﬁndings are robust and the interactions occur across multiple
domains. While we have only reviewed ﬁndings in long-term
episodic memory, there also appears to be an emerging under-
standing of the interrelatedness of category knowledge and visual
short-term memory (Brady and Alvarez, 2011; Orhan and Jacobs,
2013), working memory and immediate memory (Heussen et al.,
2011; Poirier et al., 2011). A potential area for furthering the
understanding of the inﬂuence of categorical knowledge is the
translational ability of categorical knowledge into novel domains.
For example, a transfer of category knowledge has been demon-
strated across visual and haptic modalities (Yildirim and Jacobs,
2013), and might be at the root of our ability to make predictions
for novel domains.
Another area of interest is the developmental trajectory of
the relationship between categorical knowledge and memory.
Research in the developmental literature suggests that chil-
dren, as young as 5 years old, employ categorical knowledge
of the underlying stimulus distribution to improve recall per-
formance (e.g., Duffy et al., 2006). What remains unclear is
how children use categorical knowledge of naturalistic stim-
uli learned from the environment to aid recall, as demon-
strated in adults, given their limited experience with the
environment.
In contrast to assumptions of more traditional approaches in
false memory research, that categorical knowledge leads to errors
in recall, the sum total of the ﬁndings presented here suggests
that this is not the complete story and instead categorical knowl-
edge provides a beneﬁcial source in episodic reconstruction. More
broadly, convergence across realms of cognition spurs progress
in the ﬁeld, and advances our understanding of the cognitive
system.
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